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Or so Dougherty argues. We, however, are unpersuaded. We believe Dougherty is right about promises, but wrong about consent. Although each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order to alter the morality of another's conduct.
Consider the following scenario, which we shall call Wanted Sex:
Sue wants Sam to have sex with her. Yet she is afraid that if she communicates that to him, he might think she is ''easy'' or ''trashy'' and ultimately reject a long-term relationship with her, a relationship she desires.
One night, Sam begins making sexual advances with Sue. Sue wants him to proceed, but she says nothing to encourage him and indeed resists him with some force at each step of the way. This resistance does not deter him, and ultimately they have sex.
Sue is delighted. Things worked out just as she had hoped. Sam had sex with her, but she was able to communicate that she was not consenting to it.
Later, however, after proudly confiding the event to a friend, her attitude changes. For as her friend pointed out, Sam was willing to have sex with her despite likely believing she was not consenting. Was that not a demonstration that Sam does not respect her, given his willingness to ignore her apparent lack of consent? Sue's delight at how things had transpired now turns to indignation.
Here is our verdict on Wanted Sex. Sue is right to feel indignant. If Sam believed there was a significant risk that she was not consenting, then Sam acted culpably. And indeed, such culpability might well be sufficient to justify his being criminally punished, e.g., for attempt. But Sam did not wrong Sue. He did not cross her moral boundary without her consent. Sue knew all the relevant facts at the time she and Sam had sex and yet wanted the act to occur. She surely did not feel wronged at the time the contact (the rights-based boundarycrossing) occurred, and that is because she was not wronged.
If Wanted Sex fails to convince you, here is a second scenario, a variant of a scenario one of us has used before, which we shall call Pool Party.
Jane and Jim, college seniors, have been going out together for a couple of years. But recently they had a terrible spat and are not talking to each other. Jane has decided to throw a pool party at her sorority house for all her friends. And although she still is not on speaking terms with Jim, she feels she can't very well not invite him. So she tells her younger brother Ken, who is on the college football team with Jim, to tell Jim at practice that she is having a pool party and that he's invited.
Ken, however, does not like Jim. So at practice he tells Jim that Jane is having a pool party and that she wanted Ken to tell Jim that Jim was not invited.
Jim is upset and angry that Jane is not inviting him to her party. He decides that he will crash the party anyway. So on the day of the party, Jim shows up in his swimming trunks at Jane's party. Jane sees him there and thinks nothing of it. After all, she invited him, or so she believes. In any event, she is glad he came, as that shows he is not too angry with her. Nevertheless, she does not speak to him at the party, nor does he speak to her.
Later, Ken expresses surprise that Jim came to the party, for, as he sheepishly confesses, he had told Jim the opposite of what Jane had asked him to convey. Jane now realizes that Jim probably believed he was showing up at her party against her wishes and is now even angrier at him than she had been.
Again, our verdict is that although Jim may well be culpable for coming to a party to which he believed he was not invited, he committed no wrong, no trespass, in coming. For he had Jane's
